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Abstract:  
Financial development is usually assumed to play a key role in the evolution of modern 
capitalism. A substantial strand of the academic literature, referring to Schumpeterian 
Creative Destruction, points out this role in the process of technology-based growth and 
puts the emphasis on the contribution of new financial techniques and products to the 
funding of global mergers but also to the financing of small enterprises and start-ups in 
innovative sectors. It is argued that growth-enhancing financial development might rely 
on liberalised and more competitive financial markets that could generate efficient 
devices to fund productive activities by improving regulatory-repression-free financial innovations. The second “race to reach the moon”, e.g. a new accumulation regime, 
mainly resting on speculation-based and finance-led growth, is therefore launched on the 
rule of state-supported free-market self-regulation. This new regime is also a new 
deindustrialisation process as it provokes an expansive financialisation of the entire 
economy at the expense of long-term productive activities fuelling systemic crises and 
resulting in a sharp increase in unemployment since the 1980’s. To date, the balance of 
this regime seems negative as the stabilisation policies, implemented in the aftermath of 
the 2007-08 crisis, failed to mitigate cumulated disequilibria and to give markets 
relevant incentives to generate productive activities able to prevent persistent 
unemployment. In light of such balance, it seems to be suitable to imagine a 
reindustrialisation process throughout the definancialisation of economies by 
redesigning regulatory rules to make financial markets and institutions able to support 
job-creating real growth. 
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I. Introduction 
It is usually assumed that finance and financial markets play a key role in the 
evolution of modern capitalism. Their development, considered as an outcome of 
the working of efficient free markets and private actors, is then stated as a 
necessary condition for economic growth and development. The supposed 
causality from finance to growth mainly rests on the hypothesis that free market 
price mechanisms have the full capacity to make economy work efficiently 
through the encounter between supply and demand in order to set equilibrium 
prices at lower transaction costs and lead to most efficient use of scarce 
resources, including the financial needs of productive activities. It is then 
expected that if financial repression is moved out - thanks to financial 
liberalisation process and policies -, the working of financial markets should 
allow every efficient (and then growth generating) economic activity to be 
realised and then to enhance the society’s welfare. This happy picture should also 
be improved thanks to financial innovations that should be generated under the 
incentives of new competition due to the liberalisation process in financial and 
bank markets. A substantial strand of the academic literature, referring to 
Schumpeterian Creative Destruction, points out this role in the process of 
technology-based growth.  
Theoretical development and political implementation of such assertions 
led in last decades to the development of hi-tech markets that was accompanied 
by worldwide mergers financed by syndicated loans and LBOs and gave rise to 
concentrated industries while new techniques to fund small enterprises and 
start-ups gained ground. It is maintained that such operations, assumed to feed 
growth, might rely in liberalised financial markets that could generate efficient 
devices to fund productive activities by improving regulatory-repression-free 
financial innovations. The second “race to reach the moon”, e.g. a new 
accumulation regime, mainly founded upon speculation-based financial growth, is 
therefore launched. In this direction, most emerging economies experienced 
several crises in the 1990s while hi-tech and mortgage bubbles fuelled systemic 
crises in advanced economies in the 2000s and resulted in a sharp increase in 
unemployment. To date, the balance of this regime seems negative as expanding 
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finance is related to poorly performing production and the stabilization policies, 
implemented in the aftermath of the 2007-08 crisis, failed to mitigate cumulated 
disequilibria and to give markets relevant incentives to generate productive 
activities able to prevent persistent unemployment. In order to deal with this 
issue this paper seeks to show that the ongoing 2007-20?? crisis is a result of a 
new institutional accumulation regime (financialisation, finance-dominated) 
which is a new process of deindustrialisation in the last decades, moving from 
productive real economy related profit accumulation into speculative financial 
rent generating operations. It is then maintained that the necessary 
definancialisation for a reindustrialisation calls for alternative policies that must 
aim at preventing finance-led markets domination over the whole economy and 
redesigning financial structures, institutions and regulatory framework able to 
support job-creating time-consistent growth. Therefore it seems that one of the 
required conditions for the sustainability of accumulation regime lies in the 
reframing of financial activities and markets according to alternative regulatory 
rules able to give private actors strong incentives to undertake long-term 
productive activities and to reduce speculative pressures on economic decisions 
and strategies.  
In this aim the paper is organised as follows. The second section 
summarises the arguments about the finance-growth nexus to underline links 
between banks/financial system and the financing of productive activities. It then 
shows that from the 1970s-1980s advanced countries have witnessed a strong 
financial liberalisation process that transformed those economies into 
financialised structures at the expense of industrial activities. Debt-led rent-
seeking activities created old but renewed speculative rent sectors (real estate), 
tax structures have been modified to give bad incentives (low capital taxation) to 
the use of capital and bank credit, replacing productive-long term activities and 
gains. The third section states that this evolution resulted in a new finance-led 
accumulation regime implying job-destructive deindustrialisation process where 
service sector domination is transformed into deindustrialisation through 
financialisation-rentierisation. The last section then maintains that subsequent 
and successive crises seem to point to the fact that financialisation is not the 
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panacea for growth. In this line, the crucial question asked is: how long before 
sustainable long-term financing mechanisms and supportive regulatory rules can 
be designed and implemented as a consistent growth framework?  
 
II. Financial development, liberalisation and finance-growth nexus  
A substantial strand of the academic literature maintains that financial 
development and deepening would favour productivity and growth in general and 
industrialization in particular1 because of the multiple functions that 
finance/financial system performs in the process of economic development and 
growth: mobilization of savings and their efficient allocation to productive uses, 
facilitating (and reducing the costs of) transactions, improving risk management 
and corporate control, etc. Barajas et al. (2012), in a comprehensive survey on 
those arguments state that: “Through these functions, a country providing an 
environment conducive to greater financial development would have higher 
growth rates, with much of the effect coming through greater productivity rather 
than a higher overall rate of investment”. 
These assertions underline the importance of the development of financial 
markets in the growth process. As it is stated in Ülgen (2013a) the financial 
development (financial deepening) is defined through the breadth (broad markets 
with wide transactions, numerous actors), the depth (deep markets with wide 
range of products) and the liquidity (liquid markets without restriction on 
financial transactions) of financial markets. Such a development is assumed to 
spur growth throughout its effects on the real economy either on the supply side 
(supply-push) increasing and improving availability of finance for the real 
economy, on the demand side (demand-pull process) designing new financial tools 
in accordance with the demand of entrepreneurs who need further specific 
finance.  
Dorrucci et al. (2009: 19) maintain that:  "A domestic financial market is 
developed when it consists of complete markets where: (i) an equilibrium price is 
determined for every asset in every state of the world; (ii) assets are available 
                                                          
1
 For a comprehensive synthesis of such an assertion, see Hartmann et al. 2007. 
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that protect against adverse shocks and (iii) other important features supplement 
completeness, such as transparency reducing asymmetric information problems, 
competition and the rule of law”. Related to the aforementioned view, it is also 
stated that: "Domestic financial development is the capability of one country to 
channel savings into investment efficiently and effectively within its own borders 
owing to (i) the quality of its institutional and regulatory framework, (ii) the size 
of its financial markets, the diversity of its financial instruments and private 
agents’ ease of access to them and (iii) the financial markets’ performance, e.g. in 
terms of efficiency and liquidity” (Ibid.). This definition gives the common ground 
of standardized approaches in the studies on the finance-growth-development 
nexus that assume that the efficiency of a financial system is positively 
influenced by financial development. This latter –also called financial 
modernization- refers to “the process of financial innovation as well as 
institutional and organizational improvements in a financial system that reduce 
asymmetric information, increase the completeness of markets, add possibilities 
for agents to engage in financial transactions through (…) contracts, reduce 
transaction costs and increase competition” (Hartmann et al., 2007: 5). 
In the literature quoted above, financial development is usually related to 
the liberalisation process. Following the well known works of Goldsmith, 
McKinnon and Shaw in the 1960s/70s, it is asserted that liberalized finance 
would improve the competitive incentives leading to innovations and then 
allowing banks to provide more efficient financial services (Levine, 2005). 
Consequently, more competition and opened markets would foster growth and 
improve economic stability, at least in the long run.  
Therefore, one can draw from this approach the following critical 
assertions: 
1) The financial development does mean financial liberalisation since it is 
assumed to rest on the opening of capital account (Chinn and Ito, 2005); 
2) There is a positive (and sometimes causal) relation between financial 
development and economic growth. Klein and Olivei (1999) maintain that capital 
account liberalisation can accelerate economic growth throughout financial 
development and intensification of competition and importation of efficient 
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financial services from abroad. Bekaert et al. (2005) then argue that liberalised 
capital account does directly and instantaneously spur economic growth. La 
Porta et al. (2002) explore the effect of state ownership of the banking sector in 
economic growth and show that state ownership and control of banks in the 
1960s/1970s is associated with slower subsequent growth since it is assumed that 
the publicly owned/controlled banks prevent the development of financial 
markets and then hamper the reallocation of capital (Hartmann et al, 2007).  
Papaioannou (2007, p. 13) remarks that those works are supportive to 
political public-choice theories of state control: “according to which state 
intervention to credit leads to resource misallocation. Their results contradict 
"development" theories of state ownership that emphasize the positive effect that 
government can have in banking, for example by mitigating negative 
externalities, encouraging risk-taking investment, financing strategic sectors, 
etc.” 
It is worth noting that works on the finance-growth nexus claim to take 
place in a Schumpeterian perspective as Schumpeter argued that the services 
provided by financial intermediaries (mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, 
facilitating transactions, etc.) are essential for technological innovation and 
economic development as a monetary complement of the growth process (for a 
critical analysis of such an assertion see Ülgen, 2013a). King and Levine (1993) 
state that Schumpeter might have been right about the importance of finance for 
economic development as financial services would stimulate economic growth by 
increasing the rate of capital accumulation and by improving the allocative 
efficiency of markets2.  
In this vein, recent evolution of markets has been encouraged by the 
conviction that deregulated markets can self-work at equilibrium without 
prudential regulatory mechanisms since it was assumed that free financial 
markets should minimise the possibility of financial crises and the need for 
government bailouts. Therefore, more decentralised and private control practices 
                                                          
2
 Trew (2007) offers a critical analysis on the finance-growth nexus from a long-run historical and 
theoretical perspective, putting the emphasis on the interrelations between scale, finance and 
infrastructural development. 
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– the so-called micro-prudential mechanisms – are substituted for macro-
prudential public supervision rules. The light-touch regulation of financial 
institutions and markets allowed banks to manage their risks through their own 
internal models and through ratings they purchase on the securities they issue.  
Greenspan (1997) maintains that detailed rules and standards have 
become both burdensome and ineffective, if not counterproductive. He then 
asserts that the main regulatory rule must be to assure that effective risk 
management systems are in place in the private sector in order to foster financial 
innovation without imposing rules that inhibit it. In the same vein, Beck et al. 
(2006) argue that regulatory policies that restrict entry and banks' activities are 
negatively associated with bank stability and that banking systems with more 
restrictions on banks' activities and barriers to bank entry are more likely to 
suffer systemic banking distress. Van Hoose (2010) presents also some pitfalls of 
highly regulated banking systems.  
Such a theoretical and policy perspective is at the core of deregulatory 
policies that have been implemented since the late 1970s. Regulatory and 
technological barriers among different types of intermediaries have tumbled 
while new financial instruments and practices have proliferated. This new 
financial environment would support the Schumpeterian vision of creative 
destruction process by which innovations replace old methods and goods with 
better process, commodities, and services.  
Structural changes occurred from the 1970-80s, along with financial 
innovations supported by supervisory agencies and legislators, helped modify the 
traditional banking business model. The change came on both the liability side of 
bank balance sheets (for instance, through money market mutual funds), and on 
the asset side, with the growth of public capital markets, and led to several large, 
complex and highly leveraged financial companies. The financial engineering on 
securitization and associated derivative instruments accompanied this evolution 
and changed the character of the financial sector. Obviously, banks’ innovations 
change the economic conditions as much as the entrepreneurial innovations. 
They affect the functioning of economic engine because they modify the monetary 
and financial conditions on which the whole economic structure is founded. Most 
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of the recent monetary and financial innovations seem to increase the elasticity 
of finance. However, in view of the current financial disequilibria faced by 
numerous economies in the world, such financial innovation dynamics present a 
real challenge to the systemic stability. 
The question is: does financial development/financial deepening that one 
can also name today as financialisation (as it is assumed to be related to the 
openness and liberalization of markets in order to allow free market-price 
mechanism to play their “natural equilibrating” role on the path of higher 
efficiency) lead obviously to better financing conditions of efficient economic 
activities and then to economic growth. The answer of this paper is no since the 
evolution of modern capitalism brought to the fore a new unsustainable 
accumulation regime generating expansive deindustrialisation in favour of 
expansive financialisation. The alternative suggested consists in reframing 
financial markets and institutions according to some collectively consistent rules 
aiming at attaining a desired level of productive activities able to give more 
stable employment and sustainable long term growth directed towards economic 
and social development. 
 
III. Financialisation: new deindustrialisation pattern as a new accumulation 
regime 
Deindustrialisation can usually be defined as the relative decline of the share of 
industrial activities in total output and employment, replaced by service 
activities even if in most modern economies industrial activities are in strong 
interdependence (accompanied, strengthened, reframed, etc.) with service 
activities. However, the decline of industries, the deindustrialisation 
phenomenon can be thought as a major concern in the evolution of economies 
when a growing and persistent unemployment and output decline are observed. 
That means that the deindustrialisation is studied as a major economic concern 
when the service sectors are not able to generate employment and growth to 
compensate the structural transformation of modern economies in their 
transition from agricultural to industrial and from industrial to service activities 
dominated societies. This kind of concern becomes more worrisome faced with 
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institutional changes in domestic economies and changes in international 
economic relations.  
In the theoretical framework of deindustrialisation (Rowthorn and Wells, 
1987; Maroto-Sanchez, 2010, to quote but a few) two types of de-industrialization 
can be considered: the positive deindustrialisation – due to productivity growth 
differentials between the manufacturing industry and the service industry such 
that higher productivity growth in the manufacturing industry generates a shift 
of employment into to the service industry -, and the negative deindustrialisation 
–due to the recession in the manufacturing industry that make (only) part of 
unemployment move from the manufacturing into the service industry.  
Studies on the deindustrialisation-reindustrialisation phenomenon in 
advanced economies enjoy renewed interest in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 
crisis and in the wake of subsequent worldwide recession that fuels persistent 
unemployment in most developed economies (Tregenna, 2011). Parallel to this, 
issues related to the links between finance and financing conditions of innovative 
productive activities come again into the picture in the aim of studying the 
recurrent debate on the finance-growth nexus (Mina et al. 2012) and on financing 
constraints and frictions in the credit markets which might preclude high-quality 
productive entrepreneurial plans (Kerr and Manda, 2009; Ülgen, 2013b). 
Transformations of institutional forms and of growth regime may be 
studied in terms of institutional regime of accumulation (O’Hara, 2012) or 
through the social structure of accumulation theory (SSA) as Kotz (2008) 
maintains that the particular institutional form of capitalism has changed 
periodically since capitalism emerged several centuries ago. Modern capitalism, 
i.e. neoliberalism can be understood as the latest institutional form of capitalism. 
The SSA suggests then an analysis of coherent long-lasting capitalist 
institutional structure that promotes profit-making and forms a framework for 
capital accumulation3.  
                                                          
3
 Kotz (2008) maintains that Hilferding’s finance capital and current financialisation are distinct 
phenomena as the former lies in a relationship between financial and industrial capital, with the 
banks serving as coordinating centers for financial groups In an ordered environment to prevent 
excessive competition and speculative fervors of decentralized actors in markets. The 
financialisation is the process that allows operators to seek purely financial and short-term 
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From the same perspective, the theory of regulation (Boyer and Saillard, 
2002) can be used to apprehend the deindustrialisation of the 1990-2000s that 
lies in a structural change of regime of accumulation of capitalist (and related 
peripheral) economies. As synthesised by Tahara and Uemura (2013), in a 
Fordist schema of accumulation, productivity gains are distributed into wages 
and profits. Profit increase positively affects the expected investment since there 
is a cumulative causality between the profit rate and the accumulation rate. 
Parallel to the profit side, an increase in wages reads to more consumption 
demand that will increase the capacity utilisation in the manufacturing industry. 
If the increase of consumption is sustained at the long-run, that will improve the 
long-run expected return of investment that would lead to a continuous increase 
in investment generating an accelerator effect. In this schema, two different 
patterns of growth can determine the path of evolution. The profit-led growth 
dominates if investment is highly sensitive to profits and the wage-led growth 
holds when investment is sensitive to demand expansion. These linkages mainly 
based on the links between productivity gain and demand formation give a 
specific accumulation regime called the demand regime. As stated by Petit (1986) 
in the deindustrialisation process, contrary to the strong cumulative causation 
between output growth and productivity growth in the manufacturing industry, 
the cumulative causation is relatively weak in the service industry. Therefore, if 
the service industry expands with a long-term shift of demand from the 
manufacturing industry to the service industry, the cumulative causation may 
become weaker in the economy as a whole4.  
However, in the financialisation-led deindustrialisation we do not deal 
with the traditional manufacturing-service arbitraging schema as it is studied in 
Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) where deindustrialisation is explained primarily by 
the internal evolution process of capitalist economies as a secular phenomenon of 
decline in the share of manufacturing in national employment as it was the case 
when economic development got under way, the share of agriculture in national 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
profits independent from the evolution of productive activities and usually generates a separation 
of finance from non financial activities. 
4
 For a comprehensive discussion about the links between services and growth, see Maroto-Sanchez, 2010. 
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employment felt in favour of the employment i manufacturing in the process of 
industrialisation. In their study of the transformation of the growth regime in 
Japan in the 1990s, Tahara and Uemura (2013) maintain that structural changes 
were caused by institutional changes in both the financial system and wage-labor 
nexus without the re-establishment of the mode of regulation: “In this situation, 
de-industrialization has been accelerated with institutional changes …”. Eckhard 
(2011) then argue that finance-dominated capitalism modified the redistribution 
schema at the expense of the labour income share that increased inequality in 
household income and worsened the growth conditions: “Given that aggregate 
demand and capital accumulation, and hence growth, in most of the economies 
examined here have found to be wage-led in recent empirical research, this 
should have had a depressing effect on economic performance”. This weak 
performance of lower income and real investment (“decoupling of profits and 
investment” (Guttmann, 2008)) was compensated by the financialisation of 
aggregate demand and growth partly founded on increases in household debt 
ratios that coincided with property bubbles (Stockhammer, 2010). Thus it 
appears that for the past decade (in the aftermath of the dotcom crash of the 
early 2000s), the U.S. economy growth has been driven by a real estate bubble 
that continued to fuel the financialisation process and financial gains, started in 
the late 1970s. Hudson (2010) notes that “mortgages account for 70 percent of the 
U.S. economy’s interest payments, reflecting the fact that real estate is the 
financial system’s major customer”. Economic evolution was then such that the 
entire U.S. economy, and in its lap, all the world economy, had become a real 
estate agency completely buried in speculative positions. 
In the financialisation process, the accumulation regime is founded on the 
expectations that sustain economic engagements. These expectations rest on 
speculative positions mainly related to the likelihood of short-term high rents 
whatever the industrial-productive linkages behind the process. As the increase 
in investment is mainly in the financial sector or in some related speculative 
activities (as the home industry in the pre-crisis period), there is no necessarily 
causality from the increase in investment to an increase in industrial 
productivity which would rest on the introduction of new capital equipments and 
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the scrapping of old ones as in the case of Schumpeterian entrepreneurial 
innovations. Furthermore, the sense of the cumulative causation is different 
since the ripple effects of changes in the economy may be such that new things in 
the finance area (financial innovations) will cause a cascade of other changes that 
will not necessarily be positive for the system’s long-run stability. The 
financialisation process of capitalism then reduces the attractiveness of 
traditional productive activities resting on medium/long term financial and 
organisational engagements and substitutes the industrial and wage stagnation 
to employment based growth, finance replacing production and rent-seeking 
replacing long-term profit expectations.  
Lapavitsas (2011: 622-623) argues that financialisation is a systemic 
transformation of mature capitalist economies with three distinguishing features 
that change the sources of capitalist accumulation: “First, relations between large 
non-financial corporations and banks have been altered as the former have come 
to rely heavily on internal finance, while seeking external finance in open 
markets. Large corporations have acquired independent financial skills – they 
have become financialised. Second, banks have consequently transformed 
themselves. Specifically, banks have turned toward mediating transactions in 
open markets, thus earning fees, commissions and trading profits. They have also 
turned toward individuals in terms of lending and handling financial assets. The 
transformation of banks has relied on technological development, which has 
encouraged ‘hard’ as opposed to ‘soft’ practices of risk management. Third, 
workers have become increasingly involved with the financial system both with 
regard to borrowing and to holding financial assets. The retreat of public 
provision in housing, health, education, pensions and so on has facilitated the 
financialisation of individual income, as have stagnant real wages. The result has 
been the extraction of bank profits through direct transfers of personal revenue, a 
process called financial expropriation”. 
Stockhammer (2010) remarks that financialisation is one of the key 
components of a broader societal shift in social and economic relations from a 
Fordist accumulation regime to a new (neoliberal) regime where the increasing 
role of finance is a remarkable evolution: activity on financial markets has 
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increased faster than real activity; financial profits make up an increasing share 
of total profits, and households as well as the financial sector are taking on a lot 
more debt. Stockhammer then notes that according to data for the USA, from the 
late 1990s, stock market capitalization exceeds GDP with a spectacular turnover 
(383% in 2008), the share of financial profits and profits from abroad to total 
corporate profits has risen from just above 12% in 1948 to a peak at 53% in 2001. 
Palley (2007) remarks that: “The last two decades have been marked by rapidly 
rising household debt-income ratios and corporate debt-equity ratios. These 
developments explain both the system’s growth and increasing fragility, but they 
also indicate unsustainability because debt constraints must eventually bite. The 
risk is when this happens the economy could be vulnerable to debt-deflation and 
prolonged recession”. In the same way, in the late 1970’s bank assets were about 
100% of British GDP while at the end of the 2010’s, they reached 500% of GDP 
and more than 2/3 of profits accrued to the financial sector (Bayer, 2009). But as 
O’Hara (2012: 7) states it speculation-based growth is not a “covered growth”, i.e. 
growth sustained long enough to provide funds and for potential resources 
including debt and the financing of debt burden, to sustain profit rate and 
government surpluses. 
It is also worth noting that governance and management structures 
change with the financialisation process. Woolley and Vayanos (2012: 59) then 
argue that value managers are replaced by growth managers as the technology 
bubble inflated in 1999- 2000 and “once mispricing gets into the system, investors 
are tempted to ride the trends for short-term advantage instead of investing 
patiently on the basis of underlying worth”. 
Following Araújo, Bruno and Pimentel (2012), one can consider the 
formation and the organisation into a hierarchy of institutional forms that 
determine the realisation domain of an accumulation regime à la theory of 
regulation (see Boyer and Saillard, 2002): It is assumed that an institutional 
form is superior to another when it can impose restrictions on the structural 
configuration of the latter. That means, for instance, that when the public power 
implement liberalisation policies and sustains market freedom of private actors, 
the economic policies are therefore submitted to the interests of market actors, 
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those interests being assumed to give the entire economy an efficient operating 
way. Thus, an institutional form will be considered superior in the hierarchy to 
another if its development implies a transformation of this second form. In the 
finance-dominated regime, manufacturing activities become dominated by 
financial aims and tools as the short-term horizon of speculative rent decides of 
the best way of governance of enterprises and direct financial mechanisms 
toward immediate gain potentials without worrying about the needs of long-term 
production plans. Therefore the development and the dominance of financialised 
accumulation regime come into conflict with the characteristics (needs, conditions 
and consistent means) of industrial development and sustainable economic 
growth.  
 
IV. Bad performance and regulatory consistency for a stable capitalism 
Davidson (2002: 104-105) states that financial markets are a double-edged sword 
for the real economy. The good edge lies in the fact that financial markets makes 
real investments appear to be liquid for individual savers: “The result is that 
very large investment projects –projects often too large to be funded by any single 
individual or small group of partners – can be funded by pooling the small sums 
of many savers. As long as financial markets are orderly, financial asset holders 
believe they have a readily available fast exit strategy for liquidating their 
‘investment’ the moment they become dissatisfied with the way matters are 
developing. Without the liquidity provided by orderly markets, fast exits, even if 
they were possible, would involve very large costs and therefore the ‘risk of 
making an investment as a minority owner would be intolerable’. In the absence 
of liquid financial markets, the small sums of many savers could not be readily 
pooled and mobilized to fund the accumulation of large capital-using projects. 
The bad edge is that the existence of financial markets makes investments that 
are fixed for the community only appear to be liquid for the individual. The fast 
exit strategy that calms all financial asset holders’ fears of the uncertain future is 
available to all only as long as the vast majority of these people do not 
simultaneously try to execute this strategy. When fear of the uncertain future is 
rampant, many holders of financial assets may simultaneously rush for the exit. 
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The result is a market liquidity crisis. The resulting market crash adds to the 
instability of the real economy”.  
In the liberal area of the last four decades, the dominant wisdom was that 
free and open markets would be able to self-adjust in case of disequilibria as it is 
case in the neoclassical/new classical models of competitive economic equilibrium. 
However, recurrent emerging and transition markets’ crises of the 1980s-1990s 
and the central economies’ crashes of the 2000s cast doubt on the relevance of 
such assertions. Boyer (2000) then asks if a finance-led growth regime can be a 
viable alternative to Fordism. He states that the viability of a finance-led growth 
regime rests on a consistent monetary and financial policy able to maintain the 
new system in a stable path against all odds. New financial norms, such as 
shareholder value, new distribution rules such as financial-rent seeking mode of 
governance of firms, increased flexibility and system wide liberalization in labour 
market and wage-labour nexus become dominant and underlie a structural shift 
from manufacturing to services. The 2000s dotcom bubble crisis and the last 
2007-08 financial crisis are both related to this transformation of capitalist 
growth regime and to the weaknesses of its new regulation principles.  
Goodhart (2010) remarks that in the course of the years 1998-2006, central 
banks interventions strongly anchored on the price stability without paying due 
attention to their other major core purpose, of maintaining financial stability. 
Epstein (2002) also offers a critical analysis of such a policy orientation in a 
financialised environment. From this perspective, the problem was not a lack of 
foresight about dangers of the massive credit expansion and housing bubble, but 
a lack of instruments to content it mainly because of a lack of willingness to 
design and to use preventive rules and tools against markets’ failures. The blind 
ideological faith was much stronger than the scientific logic about the potential of 
malfunctioning of decentralised and deregulated markets and micro-decision 
units. 
So, it seems that, although the forerunner signs of an increase of the 
potential systematic risk became perceptible (through the increase of the 
amounts marketed and the number and the nature of participants in these 
markets unable to bear the constraints of a rapid self-adjustment), regulation 
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schemas remained rested on the principles of self-regulation. A contradiction 
results from this because the dominant regulatory system leaves the care of 
correcting the possible failures of market mechanisms to the market mechanisms 
themselves! The efficiency of such a mode of regulation is extremely reduced 
because of the limits of decentralized self-evaluation models coming from the 
absence of long-term macroeconomic vision and the lack of consideration of the 
interconnectedness among private actors (Ülgen, 2011). The deep 
interconnectedness among market actors and operations has a macroeconomic 
character and must be treated as such (at a macro level) while the mechanisms of 
self-regulation, based on individual evaluation, cannot include, by definition, 
tools and ways of systemic macro-regulation.  
While the regulation is based on a separation between regulators and 
regulated, the self-regulation admits the coincidence between both. However, as 
the self-regulation is more intended to protect the interests of regulated 
establishments in its own logic, the whole regulatory system is put out of the 
domain of systemic stability. The adoption of international accounting standards, 
the participation of private rating agencies to the accountability and the 
compliance (conformity of the operations with the standards) are rules of the art 
in this new structure. 
US Securities and Exchange Commission (2003) already questioned the 
risks inherent to the current mechanisms further to the scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom and underlined conflicts of interests and exclusively micro-prudent 
nature of self-evaluations (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003). Sy (2009) 
and Cantor and Mann (2009) show that the principle of self-regulation, through 
the private rating agencies involved themselves in the market activities of banks, 
generates a pro-cyclical movement by feeding the financial growth during the 
periods of boom and by abruptly stopping the evolution of asset prices during the 
periods of distress. They do not play a stabilizing role against the swelling of the 
systemic bubbles. However, analyzing the stability concerns of financial markets’ 
evolution the European Commission stated, in 2006, that a suitable equilibrium 
has been reached between the market legislation and the self-regulatory system 
without necessitating further macro regulatory rules (Journal officiel, 2006). 
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Does not it a kind of self-agreement without any objective relevance? In that 
respect, the supervision authorities played a very risky game and they lost their 
bet with the arrival of the crisis of 2007-08! 
The usual models of risk and crisis which are the formal references of the 
dominant regulatory schema do not take into account the interconnectedness 
among actors’ decisions on markets (these decisions are assumed to follow a 
Gaussian normal distribution). Therefore they do confuse micro-prudential 
regulation with macro-prudential regulation and then fall in the fallacy of 
composition (incompatibility between micro-rational behavior and macro-
consistency). The micro-prudential regulation is about variables which concern 
directly individual risks of establishments whereas the macro-prudential 
regulation considers the factors which affect the stability of the financial system 
in the whole. A critical component of the macro-prudential regulation is to 
understand the mechanisms capable of counterbalancing the effects of the 
reduction in the risk perceived by markets in period of expansion and those of the 
increase of the risk in period of contraction. The basis of macro-prudential 
regulation is that financial actors who can follow individually careful strategies, 
can collectively generate systemic concerns. Private actors as well as their 
regulators try to adopt behaviour consistent with the aim to extend the period of 
expansion on short-term speculative positions. A “macular degeneration” then 
settles down by making actors unable to consider the evolution beyond the 
peripheral opportunities they immediately expect. Dominating the behaviour and 
expectations of agents in time, this degeneration is transformed into blindness to 
the disaster (Orléan, 2009).  
Minsky’s most fundamental hypothesis about capitalism, which seems to 
be relevant in the capitalist evolution, is the statement that “Legitimate or not as 
“Keynesian doctrine”, the financial instability hypothesis fits the world in which 
we now live. In a world with sharp turnabouts in income, such as that 
experienced in 1974-75, the rise and fall of interest rates, and the epidemic of 
financial restructuring, bailouts, and outright bankruptcy, there is no need to 
present detailed data to show that a theory which takes financial instability as 
an essential attribute of the economy is needed and is relevant” (Minsky, 1982: 
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69). A possible reindustrialisation process cannot ignore the necessary 
transformation of liberalised financial markets into more stable mechanisms and 
tools of financing of productive activities, able to create sustainable employment 
at the expense of unsustainable speculative profits that are usually disconnected 
from the real time horizon of economies. But to do this, we must think about 
financial regulation in macroprudential terms by admitting that the system is 
endogenously instable and go beyond the sole analysis of incentives the 
supervision authorities must give banks to take and manage risks (in particular, 
the moral hazard implications of existing deposit insurance rules).  
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